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Modes of Political Representation:
Toward a New Typology
The mandate-independence controversy still features prominently in studies
of political representation even though the problems with its theoretical foundation
and empirical operationalization have long been recognized. This article proposes an
alternative typology of modes of representation. By combining type of control (ex
ante or ex post) with direction of the interactions (bottom-up or top-down), our
study captures the most important aspects of the relationship between voters and
representatives. We demonstrate how the typology can be used in a survey instrument
by comparing the attitudes toward representation of Dutch members of Parliament
with the attitudes held by voters, and by relating the views of the members to their
behavior.
Studies of political representation can focus either on its
outcome—the representativeness of the legislature in terms of its
members’ backgrounds (descriptive representation) or their opinions
or votes (policy representation)—or on its nature as a relationship
between voters and members of Parliament (MPs). In this paper, we
seek to contribute to the understanding of political representation as a
relationship. The relationship between voters and MPs has predomi-
nantly been discussed in terms of whether representatives should act
as “delegates,” putting instructions from the represented above their
own judgment, or as Burkean “trustees,” following their own judgment
rather than that of their constituents. This normatively oriented
“mandate-independence controversy” (Pitkin 1967) forms the basis of
probably the most influential empirical typology of the style of repre-
sentation: Eulau and Wahlke’s delegates, trustees, and politicos (for
whom “it depends” whether they follow their voters or not) (Eulau and
Wahlke 1959; Wahlke et al. 1962). It is this distinction that still features
prominently in many recent studies of the relationship between voters
and MPs (for example, Converse and Pierce 1986; Esaiasson and
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Holmberg 1996; Judge 1999; Katz 1997; Méndez-Lago and Martínez
2002; Patzelt 1997; and Saalfeld and Müller 1997).
This persistence is remarkable, given the critique, both normative
and empirical, of the typology. Back in 1967, Pitkin pointed out that the
mandate-independence controversy leads us nowhere. By its very
nature, representation implies that the representative cannot be identified
completely with the demands or interests of the represented, and neither
can the representative be completely divorced from those demands
and interests: at the extreme opposites of the mandate-independence
controversy we can no longer speak of representation.
So, insofar as the mandate-independence controversy contains a conceptual
dispute based on the meaning of representation, both sides are right. The
seemingly paradoxical meaning of representation is perpetuated in our
requirements for the activity of representing: the represented must be both
present and not present. The representative must really act, be independent;
yet the represented must be in some sense acting through him. Hence there
must be no serious persistent conflict between them. (Pitkin 1967, 154)
There is thus no answer to the mandate-independence controversy.
Empirically, all representatives can be classified as politicos in Eulau
and Wahlke’s typology.
. . . if 0.00 means a representative’s legislative record which is purely and
unyieldingly Burkean, totally without regard for expressed district wishes,
and 1.00 reflects a legislative record laid down at every step in response to
perceived district instructions, we should be surprised if many political repre-
sentatives in legislative bodies could be created much outside the limits of a
narrower range, such as .30 to .70, or even .35 to .65. (Converse and Pierce
1986, 497)
The empirical critique of the typology also takes issue with its
operationalization as a relationship between an individual MP and a
geographical constituency, without reference to the existence of
disciplined political parties (Thomassen 1994). In their analysis of the
style of political representation in France (in comparison with the United
States and the Netherlands), Converse and Pierce transformed the
dimension from trustee to delegate into a triangle by adding the loyal
partisan as a third role type (Converse and Pierce 1986, 664–96). As
they argue themselves, however, the loyal partisan is not an independent
third role, but merely another variety of the delegate, with the party
rather than the people as the focus of representation. Converse and
Pierce’s triangle is important for our understanding of the legislator’s
behavior, but it does not help us understand political representation as a
relationship between the representative (individual or collective, meaning,
the party) and the voters.
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TABLE 1
Style of Representation (with party voters as focus),
1972–2001
1972 1979 1990 2001
Delegates (“Follow party voters”)  7  7 10 21
Politicos (“It depends”) 22 29 34 40
Trustees (“Follow own judgment”) 71 64 56 40
100 100 100 101
N 141 129 130 129
Source: Dutch Parliamentary Studies.
The critique of the Eulau-Wahlke typology and of the mandate-
independence controversy on which it is based is borne out in our own
interviews with Dutch MPs, held at regular intervals over the past
three decades.1 Given the absence of electoral districts in the current
Dutch electoral system, members were asked whether MPs should
vote in Parliament according to the views of their party’s voters or
according to their own views. MPs who advocate adherence to the
party voters’ views can be regarded as delegates, those who argue
that MPs should stick to their own judgment are trustees, and those for
whom the answer depends on the issue belong to the category of politicos.
It would seem that, at least since 1972, the Burkean trustee has
gradually been losing ground, but primarily to the politico, who cannot
choose between the two main alternatives and answers that “it depends”
whether representatives should follow their party’s voters or their own
opinions. As can be seen in Table 1, by 2001, no fewer than 40% of
MPs belonged to that indeterminate category. Even MPs who eventually
did pick one of the alternatives complained to their interviewers: “That
question is wrong,” “It does not work that way,” “That is almost
unanswerable,” “You cannot deal with this in a black-and-white fashion,”
“That is a silly question,” “Neither answer is correct,” “The answering
categories are incomplete,” and so on. In other words, we can apply
the Eulau-Wahlke typology in the sense that MPs will give answers to
our questions, but the distinction does not seem to provide meaningful
insights into the relationship between the represented and the
representatives.
510 Rudy B. Andeweg and Jacques Thomassen
Toward a New Typology
The search for a new approach to the variety of interactions that
make up political representation seems long overdue. Here, we present
a new typology that avoids at least some of the ambiguities resulting
from the use of the trustee-delegate categories. We demonstrate how
this new typology can be used in a survey instrument to obtain empirical
findings, and we show that the typology proves useful for comparing
the views of MPs regarding political representation with the views of
voters and with the MPs’ own behavior.
Fortunately, this typology can build on some recently developed
perspectives on political representation, including the application of the
microeconomic principal-agent framework to politics (Bendor, Glazer,
and Hammond 2001). In this framework, political representation is
viewed as a delegation of power from a constituency or group of voters
(the principal) to a particular party or MP (the agent), and the central
question is how, and to what extent, the principal can prevent the agent
from acting in a way contrary to the demands or interests of the
principal. Instruments to prevent such agency loss can either precede
the representative relationship (ex ante controls, such as the screening
of potential candidates or parties, or drawing up a contract) or follow it
(ex post controls, such as monitoring and reporting requirements, or
institutional checks). Ex ante controls have as the ultimate sanction the
decision by the principal not to engage the agent; ex post controls have
as the ultimate sanction the decision by the principal to discontinue the
relationship with the agent. Mansbridge has introduced the terms
promissory representation, for representative relations largely based
on ex ante controls, and anticipatory representation, for such relations
that rely primarily on ex post controls (2003). Representative relations
will usually rely on a mixture of ex ante and ex post controls, but the
emphasis varies. In general, ex ante controls seem to be more charac-
teristic of parliamentary democracies than of presidential democracies,
with consequences for the efficiency and transparency of the political
system (Strøm 2000, 2003).
Applying agency theory to political representation has one impor-
tant drawback: it is unidirectional in the sense that it assumes the voters
have both clear policy preferences that are to be translated into policy
by the representatives, and control mechanisms at their disposal to
restrict the representatives’ room for maneuver. Representatives are
merely recipients of the voters’ demands, and objects of their control.
Other (less Rousseauist, more Madisonian or Schumpeterian) views of
political representation are not unidirectional and see representative
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democracy as a wedding of leadership and popular control (Brennan
and Hamlin 1999). Although representative democracy is often described
as classical direct democracy that had to be watered down by adding
representation to overcome problems of scale, the historical reality is a
more-elitist one of feudal forms of representation and leadership to
which elements of popular control were added later (Manin 1997).
Esaiasson and Holmberg include both the bottom-up and top-down
directions in their study of representative democracy in Sweden
(Esaiasson and Holmberg 1996). In representation run from below, the
process starts with the citizens, who enter the political process with
crystallized views. Political representation then serves to translate these
views as best as possible into government policy, as it is described in
the principal-agent model. In representation run from above, the repre-
sentatives are assigned a more-active role. The process of political
representation starts with the representatives, who enter the political
process with their views and put these views to the citizens for their
approval. In representation from below, popular preferences are exog-
enous, and representative democracy can be described as populist; in
representation from above, popular preferences may well be endogenous
to the interactions with politicians, and representative democracy can
therefore be characterized as elitist.
According to Esaiasson and Holmberg, the touchstone for repre-
sentation from below is responsiveness, the degree to which represen-
tatives express the opinions of the represented. The touchstone for
representation from above is accountability. But in Esaiasson and
Holmberg’s description of their showcase model of representation from
above (the responsible party model), the authors are more ambivalent:
“Parties compete for voters’ support on the basis of programs summa-
rizing the policies they intend to pursue during the coming mandate
period. . . . At the next election, finally, the voters get the opportunity to
hold the governing party or coalition accountable for what it has and
has not done, and they take position on the programs of the parties for
the subsequent mandate period” (Esaiasson and Holmberg 1996, 3).
The concept of a mandate later becomes the defining element (310–13). A
mandate authorizes the parties to pursue particular policies in the years
to come, whereas accountability forces the parties to seek approval for
policies pursued in the years past. Authorization is possible without
accountability and vice versa (Manin, Przeworski, and Stokes 1999).
By combining the two, Esaiasson and Holmberg assume that people
vote prospectively (mandate, or ex ante controls) and retrospectively
(accountability, or ex post controls) at the same time. This is only possible
if voters view both future plans and past performance either positively
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or negatively, but if the two evaluations diverge, voters can make a
choice only by assigning different weights to mandate and accountability
(or they remain so cross-pressured that they abstain from voting).
Fortunately, Esaiasson and Holmberg’s distinction solves a problem
for agency theory (the problem of unidirectionality), and agency theory
solves a problem for Esaiasson and Holmberg (the problem of not
distinguishing ex ante and ex post controls). By combining direction
(from above or from below) and type of control (ex ante or ex post),
we achieve a typology of four modes of political representation. The
modes are presented in Figure 1.
Delegation
Representation from below and ex ante is probably the ideal-type
of representative democracy as delegation, but it makes demanding
assumptions: The voters must have preferences that are both exogenous
and stable, and the political agenda must be predictable.
Responsiveness
Representation from below and ex post is best illustrated by
analyses of political representation in the United States, with its extreme
emphasis on responsiveness: Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson (1995)
Ex Ante Ex Post
From Above authorization accountability
From Below delegation responsiveness
Control Mechanism
FIGURE 1
Modes of Political Representation
 Direction
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call it “dynamic representation” and King (1997, 165–66) calls it
“hyperresponsiveness.” The driving force is the representative’s desire
to please (Mansbridge 2003) or fear: “Like antelope in an open field,
[politicians] cock their ears and focus their full attention on the slightest
sign of danger” (Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson 1995, 559). This mode
also has been called “running scared” (the title of King 1997). This
form of representation assumes that voters have exogenous prefer-
ences, but neither these preferences nor the political agenda need to be
stable. Representatives are assumed to be able to gauge changing
popular preferences, and the threat of removal from office can only be
credible if there is electoral choice, that is, an opposition, and if repre-
sentatives are willing and allowed to seek reelection. (If the represen-
tative is a party, rather than an individual, then this assumption poses no
problem.)
Authorization
An example of representation from above and ex ante is the
responsible party model (American Political Science Association 1950;
Ranney 1954), in which cohesive political parties present distinct
programs to the voters, who then form preferences for one program or
another and vote accordingly. Through these votes, the party is mandated
to (try to) implement its manifesto; the central role of the party program
in this mode reflects “an intense commitment to a mandate theory of
representation” (Converse and Pierce 1986, 706). Voters are not
required to have exogenous preferences, but if they lack such prefer-
ences, they are assumed to be able to develop them in reaction to the
campaign (endogenous preferences). It is therefore also assumed that
there is electoral choice: Voters are able to distinguish between two or
more representatives or parties. A further assumption is that the political
agenda is predictable.
Accountability
Representation from above and ex post is not often recognized in
the literature, but in this mode the representative (party or politician),
like a political entrepreneur, “is essentially proactive, identifying and
promoting policies that she believes will be appreciated ex post rather
than preferred ex ante” (Brennan and Hamlin 1999, 115). This mode
of representation makes the fewest assumptions. Voter preferences
may be exogenous or endogenous, stable or changing, and the agenda
need not be predictable. The only assumptions are the availability of an
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alternative, that is, electoral choice, and the member’s ambition and
opportunity to stand for reelection (again, where representatives are
parties, this motivation is not a question). Another usual assumption for
this mode is that the voters are able to clearly assign responsibility for
government performance (Manin, Przeworski, and Stokes 1999, 47).
Separation of powers and semipresidentialism obfuscate responsibility,
as does coalition government, whereas single-party government within
a parliamentary system supposedly optimizes accountability. But this
logic confuses two stages in the chain of delegation and accountability
in a parliamentary system; voters delegate to Parliament, and Parliament
delegates to the government. Voters can reward and punish parties
both for their performance in government and their performance in
Parliament. Divided government and coalition government may increase
the costs of information for voters, but they do not render representa-
tion from above and ex post impossible.
Depending on the political system, the voters in these four modes
of representation can be operationalized as constituency voters or a
national electorate, and the representatives can be individual MPs or
political parties. The modes of representation should be regarded as
ideal-types (in the Weberian sense) and used to compare democratic
political systems: a particular system’s design may contain elements
(binding mandates, recall elections, electoral systems that facilitate
accountability over mandate or vice versa, and so forth) that approxi-
mate one mode of representation more than other modes. The typology
can also be used at the individual level to study the attitudes of both
MPs and voters toward the representative relationship. In the remainder
of this paper, we aim to demonstrate the typology’s value for the study
of such individual attitudes.
Dutch Voters and MPs, and the Modes of Representation
In order to gauge the attitudes of voters and MPs toward the
dimensions and modes of political representation, we operationalized
the two dimensions of the typology in the form of two questions. The
first question:
In their relationship with their voters, politicians may emphasize different
aspects. Which of these two aspects do you think is most important?
— translating the political views of citizens into policy as accurately as
possible;
— seeking support from the voters for the political views of their own
party.
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TABLE 2
The Two Dimensions of Representation: MPs and Voters
(in percentages)
MPs Voters
2001 2002a 2002b 2003
Most Important Direction
From Below 33 78  85  76
From Above 67 22  15  24
N 126 1,531  1,125  2,525
  (excluding % don’t know) 16 3  14  2
Most Important Control
Ex Ante 63 72  70
Ex Post 37  28  30
N 107  1,187  2,520
  (excluding % don’t know) 28  9 2
Sources:  For MPs, Dutch Parliamentary Study 2001. For the voters, 2002a: Dutch
National Election Study, May 2002; 2002b: NIPO telepanel survey, October 2002;
2003: Dutch National Election Study.
differentiates between representation from below and representation
from above. The second question:
In our political system, elections have various functions. Which of these two
functions do you think is most important?
— in elections, politicians account to the voters for their actions in the
past;
— in elections, politicians put their plans for the future to the voters.
differentiates between ex post controls (retrospective voting) and ex ante
controls (prospective voting). Table 2 charts responses from voters
and MPs.
The reactions of MPs to these questions (which were tape-
recorded) indicate that the original Dutch versions of these two questions
primarily elicited normative replies. Only small numbers of voters and
MPs were unable to answer the questions. The only exception occurred
when the second question was put to MPs in the 2001 Parliamentary
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Study: 28% failed to choose between the two alternatives, arguing that
it was impossible to separate the two: “Both are equally important,”
“No voter is voting for you if your past performance has not given
them the confidence that you will fulfill your promises, and if you do not
have good plans, they will not vote for you either,” “If you do only one
of the two, you are doing only half the work,” and so on. Although they
maintained that it was impossible to choose, some respondents argued
that the emphasis could be on one or the other depending on whether
one sought election or reelection: “Both are important because one
applies to new parties and the other to parties who want to be elected
again.” Our typology is indeed asymmetrical; from the perspective of
the representatives, the two modes relying on ex post controls assume
incumbency, whereas the two modes that employ ex ante controls do not.
From the perspective of the voters, however, this asymmetry is
not a problem. They can use their vote as an ex post control to punish
incumbents by voting for a new challenger. According to a 2002 NIPO
Telepanel survey, 43% of the voters for the new populist List Pim
Fortuyn (LPF) saw elections primarily as an ex post mechanism, as
compared to 25% of the voters who voted for parties already repre-
sented in Parliament. Incumbent MPs may campaign on both their
records and their promises, but voters cannot attach equal weight to
both functions of elections. As previously mentioned, it is possible for
voters to evaluate both performance and plans positively, or to react
negatively to both. As ex ante and ex post controls then lead to congruent
decisions, it becomes impossible to distinguish the two functions. On
the other hand, if voters like a party’s record but dislike its manifesto,
or vice versa, one of the two electoral functions must be given prefer-
ence; it is impossible to vote retrospectively and prospectively at the
same time. Additional institutional features may emphasize one elec-
toral function or the other: Legally binding mandates for representa-
tives reinforce elections as ex ante controls (but they were abolished
long ago in the Netherlands and in most other Western democracies),
and the possibility of recall reinforces the ex post control function of
elections (but such provisions have nowhere been introduced at the
national level). Currently, almost everywhere, elections constitute one
instrument for two functions, and it is impossible to optimize both func-
tions at the same time (Manin, Przeworski, and Stokes 1999).
It may be possible to rephrase the question that we put to MPs in
such a way as to force them to make a choice between ex ante and ex
post controls, but it is interesting that the voters have fewer problems in
choosing between the two functions of elections. In the 2002 NIPO
electronic survey, more than 90% made a choice despite the fact that
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TABLE 3
The Relationship between Direction and Control Mechanism
in Political Representation
Chi square df p N Cramer’s V
MPs (2001) 1.484 1 .223 104 .119
Voters (2002) 2.456 1 .117 1,103 .047
Voters (2003) 16.37 1 <.000 2,483 .081
Sources: For MPs, Dutch Parliamentary Study 2001. For voters, 2002: NIPO telepanel
survey; 2003: Dutch National Election Study.
in this study the respondents were explicitly presented with the alterna-
tive “Don’t know.”  When that option was not made explicit, only 2%
of voters failed to make a choice in the 2003 National Election Study.
Apart from the inability of some MPs to choose between the ex
ante and ex post control functions of elections, the typology seems to
survive its first application rather well. The question about the direction
of representation was put to the voters in three different studies within
a year (Spring 2002–Winter 2003), with very similar results. Two of
these studies also asked the question about the type of control
mechanism, and the results were virtually identical (see Table 2). If we
were measuring non-attitudes, then we would not expect such stable
outcomes, but we cannot completely exclude that possibility on the
basis of aggregate outcomes. Fortunately, the 2003 National Election
Study includes a panel of respondents who had been interviewed in the
2002 National Election Study as well. This feature allows us to assess
attitude stability at the individual level for the voters on at least one of the
two questions (the question about the direction of representation). Of the
1,297 respondents in the panel, 1,250 (96%) answered the question in both
waves, and 75% of those chose the same alternative on both occasions.
The two questions are intended to tap different dimensions of
political representation, and, consequently, the answers to the two
questions should not be strongly correlated. One might think that there
is overlap between alternatives on the two dimensions (seeking support
from the voters for the political views of the party, and putting plans for
the future to the voters), but such fears are unfounded, as can be seen
from the data in Table 3.
Only for the voters in the 2003 National Election Study did we
find a statistically significant association between the two questions.
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This result is not surprising when we consider chi-square’s sensitivity
to sample size and the large number of respondents (N = 2,483). The
association is still quite weak (Cramer’s V = .081). In this National
Election Study, the two questions were put together, and in the 2002
NIPO internet panel study, the respondents even had both questions on
their screen, further increasing the risk of “contamination.” Yet, the
association between the two questions was weak and statistically
insignificant in this study, despite the fairly large number of observa-
tions (N = 1,103).
Finally, the new typology should also be different from the Eulau-
Wahlke typology of the style of representation. Ignoring for the moment
the criticisms of this concept and its operationalization, we cross-
tabulated the MPs’ answers to the question of whether MPs should
follow their voters’ or their own judgment with their answers to the
questions about the direction and the type of control mechanism, both
separately and in combination as our four-fold typology of modes of
representation. There is hardly any difference between delegates and
trustees with regard to the importance that they attach to ex ante or ex
post controls (Cramer’s V = .138, p = .379).2 Trustees are slightly
more inclined than delegates to see representation from above as most
important, but the association is not statistically significant (Cramer’s
V = .146, p = .277). Finally, there is no significant association between
style and the four modes (Cramer’s V = .317, p = .126).
Varying Modes of Representation
From Table 2 it is clear that not all MPs and not all voters have
the same attitudes toward the dimensions and modes of representa-
tion. The importance of political parties in Dutch politics makes it plausible
that some of the variation in attitudes among MPs can be accounted
for by party. MPs from governing parties may, for example, emphasize
that the government has received a mandate for its policies in the
previous elections (representation from above and ex ante), whereas
MPs from opposition parties may argue that they are more in touch
with current voter demands and that the elections should serve to throw
the incumbent “rascals” out (representation from below and ex post).
Another hypothesis is that MPs from parties with highly ideological
profiles tend to assign more importance to representation from above
than do parties of a catch-all nature: Ideologues do not need the voters
to tell them what should be done; they merely need the voters’ consent
for their own plans. In addition to party, an MP’s experience is likely to
affect that member’s attitudes toward representation. For example, a
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TABLE 4
Determinants of MPs’ Attitudes toward Political Representation
Direction   Control Modes
From From From Below From Above
Party Below Above Ex Ante Ex Post Ex Ante Ex Post Ex Ante  Ex Post
Government 35.8 64.2 64.1 35.9 23.8 14.3 41.3 20.6
Opposition 28.9 71.1 60.5 39.5 12.2 17.1 48.8 22.0
   Cramer’s V .07 (p = .43) .036 (p = .706)  .146 (p = .531)
More Ideological  4.8 95.2 68.2 31.8  —  5.0 70.0 25.0
Less Ideological 39.0 61.0 61.2 38.8 23.8 17.9 38.1 20.2
   Cramer’s V .271 (p = .002) .059 (p = .545)   .316 (p = .016)
MP’s Incumbency
   < 4 years 34.3 65.7 49.1 50.9 18.2 20.0 30.9 30.9
   4–8 years 44.4 55.6 67.9 32.1 28.6 14.3 39.3 17.9
   > 8 years 13.0 87.0 90.9 9.1  9.5  4.8 85.7  0.0
   Cramer’s V .223 (p =.043) .339 (p =.002)  .327 (p =.001)
Note: Entries are row percentages. Government = PvdA, VVD, D66; Opposition = CDA,
SP, Green Left, Christian Union, SGP. More ideological = SP, Green Left, Christian
Union, SGP; Less ideological = PvdA, CDA, VVD, D66.
Source: Dutch Parliamentary Study 2001
seasoned MP is more likely to feel that the best division of labor is for
politicians to elaborate policy proposals and for voters to react to those
proposals (representation from above and ex ante).
The hypothesis that membership of a governing party would lead
to a different attitude toward representation than would opposition status
is roundly rejected by the data, as is shown in Table 4. The associations
are weak and insignificant, and, with respect to representation from
below/from above, the data point in the opposite direction. Apparently,
the attitudes toward political representation are not determined by a
temporary institutional position. There is more support for the other
two hypotheses. MPs from the ideologically more-pronounced parties
of the Left (the Socialist Party and the Green Left) and the Right (the
two orthodox Protestant parties) assign significantly more importance
to representation from above than do MPs from the more-centrist
parties. A closer look shows that Labor Party (PvdA) MPs have rather
similar attitudes as MPs from smaller ideological parties, despite the
fact that the Labor Party (in government for a third consecutive term
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at the time of our study) is widely perceived as having moved to the
center. Its then-leader, Wim Kok, was well known for his insistence
that the party should “shed its ideological feathers.” Perhaps the Labor
MPs’ “from above” attitudes reflect their party’s more-ideological
tradition. Length of incumbency also has the hypothesized effect,
although the importance given to representation from above does not
increase monotonously.
There is less of a partisan pattern to the voters’ attitudes. One of
the few exceptions has already been mentioned: In 2002, LPF voters
attached more weight to the ex post function of elections. This party’s
voters were somewhat more inclined to see representation from below
as most important. In the 2002 and 2003 National Election Studies,
85% to 86% of LPF voters opted for representation from below, as
compared to 76% to 78% of the electorate as a whole. More generally,
we expect voters’ level of education to be associated with the impor-
tance that they assign to representation from below because “cognitive
mobilization” has been linked to a shift from “elite-directed” to “elite-
directing” participation (see, for example, Inglehart 1977).  As the data
in Table 5 show, voters with more than elementary education do indeed
emphasize representation from below more than voters with only
elementary education, but the association is not strong.
The most striking difference in the attitudes toward political rep-
resentation is not between various categories of MPs or of voters, but
rather between MPs and voters. As Table 2 clearly shows, MPs are
more inclined than voters to emphasize elections as an ex post mecha-
nism of popular control, but the difference is not very pronounced, and
a large majority of both MPs (63%) and voters (70–72%) see the
prospective function of elections as more important than the retrospec-
tive function. This finding supports Fearon’s suggestion that
[V]oters think about elections more as opportunities to try to select good
types than as sanctions to deter shirking by future incumbents. . . . The
popular dislike of office seeking, support for term limits, the premium put on
politicians being principled and consistent, and the absence of concern about
“last-period effects” all suggest that voters think about elections primarily in
terms of selection. (Fearon 1999, 82)
To a large extent, MPs seem to share the voters’ view of this aspect of
political representation.
In contrast, the difference between voters and MPs when it comes
to representation from above or from below is huge. The relevant ques-
tion has been posed to voters in three national surveys, and all three
show that more than three-quarters of the voters see representation
from below as the more-important mode. For MPs, it is the other way
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TABLE 5
Cognitive Mobilization and Voter Attitudes
toward Political Representation
Direction     Control Modes
Level of From From  From Below From Above
Education Below Above Ex Ante Ex Post Ex Ante Ex Post Ex Ante  Ex Post
Elementary 69.7 30.3 67.4 32.6 45.4 25.1 22.0  7.5
Secondary 81.9 18.1 70.0 30.0 55.7 26.2 14.1  4.0
Higher 72.4 27.6 72.1 27.9 50.8 21.6 21.3  6.2
   Cramer’s V .125 (p = .000) .035 (p = .214) .127 ( p = .000)
N = 2,511 N = 2,506 N = 2,477
Source: Dutch National Election Study 2003.
around: Two-thirds of the representatives choose representation from
above as the more-important mode. In their study of political represen-
tation in France, Converse and Pierce reported that most deputies see
their role as delegates of their party, whereas most voters feel that
deputies should act as delegates of their constituency’s voters (Converse
and Pierce 1986, 687–90). Those authors do not offer an explanation
for this pattern. In light of our findings for the Netherlands, the factor
underlying the difference between voters and MPs may not be the
focus of representation (with politicians preferring the party, and voters
preferring the constituency), but rather the direction of representation
(with politicians preferring representation from above, and voters opting
for representation from below).
The result is that the distribution of voters over the four modes of
representation clearly diverges from the distribution of MPs across the
same typology. It is clear from Table 6 that the representatives have
very different attitudes with respect to political representation from
those they represent: Most voters see representation from below/ex
ante as most important, with from below/ex post taking second place
and from above/ex post rarely mentioned, but a plurality of MPs opt for
from above/ex ante with from above/ex post coming in second.
Perhaps it is not surprising that elites have an elitist view of
representation and that the people have a populist view of representa-
tion. In politics, as in social life in general, however, it bodes ill for any
relationship if the two partners have such divergent expectations of
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that relationship. In many democracies, a “confidence gap” between
voters and politicians is said to be widening (see, for instance, Pharr
and Putnam 2000), and it does not seem implausible to suggest that the
gap in attitudes toward representation illustrated in Table 6 may contribute
to this confidence gap. This logic assumes that voters can be aware
that their representatives hold different attitudes toward their relation-
ship. Some of the survey questions customarily used to measure voters’
external political efficacy may actually show the extent of this aware-
ness. For example, according to the 2003 Dutch National Election Study,
45% of voters agreed that “Parties are only interested in my vote, not
in my opinion.” If we may generalize from such findings, then we should
expect that those voters whose views of political representation are
most different from those of the MPs (that is, those voters who attach
most importance to representation from below and, to a lesser extent,
to representation ex post) will be most dissatisfied with the functioning
of Dutch democracy.
Ex Ante Ex Post
From Above
From Below
Control Mechanism
TABLE 6
The Modes of Representation and Votes Compared
(in percentages)
 Direction
MPs 2001: 21
Voters 2002: 4
Voters 2003: 5
MPs 2001: 44
Voters 2002: 12
Voters 2003: 18
MPs 2001: 19
Voters 2002: 60
Voters 2003: 52
MPs 2001: 15
Voters 2002: 25
Voters 2003: 25
MPs 2001 N = 104
Voters 2002 N = 1,103
Voters 2003 N = 2,491
Note: Percentages are of the total number of MPs and voters, respectively.
Sources: For MPs, Dutch Parliamentary Study 2001. For voters, 2002: NIPO telepanel
survey; 2003: Dutch National Election Study.
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TABLE 7
Voter Attitudes toward Political Representation and Satisfaction
with the Functioning of Democracy
Percentage Very/Fairly Satisfied
Most Important Direction
From Below 82
From Above 84
Cramer’s V .032 (p =  .252)
N 1,265
Most Important Control
Ex Ante 83
Ex Post 81
Cramer’s V .022 (p = .436)
N 1,257
Mode of Representation
From Below/Ex Ante 83
From Below/Ex Post 79
From Above/Ex Ante 84
From Above/Ex Post 88
Cramer’s V .055 (p = .286)
N 1,247
Source: Dutch National Election Study 2003.
As Table 7 illustrates, the associations between the dimensions
and modes of representation on the one hand and satisfaction with
democracy on the other hand are in the predicted direction: Satisfaction
with democracy is lower among voters who view representation from
below and representation ex post as most important. The associations
are weak, however, and not significant. Compared to most other
countries, the Netherlands still has relatively high satisfaction with
democracy; it would probably be easier to find an association between
the divergent views on representation on the one hand and satisfaction
with the functioning of democracy on the other hand in countries with
greater variation in the dependent variable. The consequences of the
incongruence between elite and mass attitudes toward political repre-
sentation for the legitimacy of representative democracy clearly warrant
further research.
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Behavioral Consequences
Finally, in order to establish the usefulness of the new typology of
political representation, we should compare the normative views of
MPs with their behavior and, in particular, with their interactions with
the people they represent. The Dutch Parliamentary Study asked MPs
how many hours they work per week (on average 65 hours), and how
many of those hours they spend on various activities. With regard to
representation, the time spent on party activities (other than those within
the parliamentary party), on contacts with individual citizens, and on
contacts with social organizations are of particular relevance.
Both the views regarding direction of representation and type of
control mechanism are related to the time that MPs invest in various
activities. Table 8 shows that MPs who see representation from above
as most important spend more time on party activities, and MPs who
view representation from below as most important invest more time in
contacts with individual citizens and social organizations. Similarly, MPs
who emphasize the retrospective function of elections (ex post con-
trols) spend more time with citizens and social organizations than within
their parties, whereas the opposite holds true for MPs who see elec-
tions as occasions to present plans for the future (ex ante controls).
The result is that MPs who see representation as from below/ex post
devote almost twice as much time to contacts with citizens and organi-
zations than do MPs who see representation from above/ex ante as
most important.
Discussion
The literature has long recognized the limitations of the theoretical
foundation and the empirical operationalization of the Eulau-Wahlke
typology of representational style that continues to dominate the study
of that aspect of political representation. Ours is a first attempt at
designing a typology that captures the most important aspects of the
interactions between voters and MPs, and that can travel across
different political and party systems. This typology builds on existing
literature by combining the focus on the type of control mechanism
from principal-agent theory with the emphasis on the direction of the
interactions introduced by Esaiasson and Holmberg. The typology has
been operationalized for studying the attitudes toward representation
of both voters and MPs in the Netherlands, and the results show that
the answers to our questions reflect real and relatively stable attitudes
and that the two dimensions in the typology are independent from each
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TABLE 8
The Modes of Representation and Time Spent
on Representational Activities
Hours per Week Spent by MPs on
Activities within Contacts with Contacts with
Own Party Individual Citizens Social Organizations
Most Important Direction
From Below 5.9 7.7 8.4
From Above 7.6 5.4 6.7
F 1.831 7.19 3.22
Most Important Control
Ex Ante 7.5 5.4 6.2
Ex Post 6.8 6.7 9.5
F .261 1.917 11.728
Mode of Representation
From Below/Ex Post 5.8 9.1 10.2
From Below/Ex Ante 6.0 6.5 7.4
From Above/Ex Post 7.4 5.4 8.7
From Above/Ex Ante 8.0 5.0 5.7
F .566 3.244 4.288
Source: Dutch Parliamentary Study 2001.
other and unrelated to the Eulau-Wahlke typology. The new typology
helps bring to light significant divergences between the views that
representatives have of political representation and the views of the
people they represent, and the typology appears to be correlated to the
actual behavior of MPs.
Although these results are encouraging, there is much room for
improvement, in particular with regard to the operationalization of the
two dimensions. We discussed the failure of more than a quarter of the
MPs in our study to choose between the prospective and retrospective
functions of elections. Moreover, the questions were attempts to
ascertain what respondents view as important, not what they perceive
the current practice of representation to be. In order to further analyze
the potential impact of the incongruence in MP and voter attitudes
toward representation, future studies should inquire both into what
respondents see as the empirical reality of representation and what
they think is most desirable.
This application of the modes of representation primarily dealt
with the attitudes of individual MPs and voters. We shall also need
to look more closely at the practice of political representation. An
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interesting test for representation from below or from above will be
whether the issue positions of parties or MPs change over time to
conform more closely to those of their (party’s or constituency’s) voters,
or whether voter positions follow party or MP positions (Esaiasson and
Holmberg 1996, 104–08). A possible test for representation ex ante or
ex post will be whether politicians or parties campaign primarily on the
basis of their records or their proposals, and whether most voters vote
retrospectively or prospectively (Fiorina 1981).
Once such attitudinal and behavioral data are available for different
countries, the typology can be used in comparative research both as a
dependent variable (to uncover the individual and institutional variables
that lead to the dominance of a particular mode of representation) and
as an independent variable (to study the effects of different modes on
policy congruence, political legitimacy, and so on).
The development of this new typology is merely a first step in
what we hope to be a renewed interest in political representation as a
dynamic relationship between citizens and their elected representatives.
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1. The Dutch Parliamentary Studies of 1968, 1972, 1979, 1990, and 2001 all
sought to interview each of the 150 members of the lower house of the Dutch Parlia-
ment. In each study, a few MPs could not or would not be interviewed; the average
response rate of the studies is 88%. All studies contained both closed and open
questions. In the 2001 study, all interviews were recorded on tape so that we can also
use the full answers or comments of the MPs to closed questions.
2. By using tests for statistical significance not only for voters but also for
MPs, we act as if we interviewed a random sample of MPs, whereas we actually tried
(and nearly succeeded) to interview the whole population.
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